

















“The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of exception’ 
in which we live is the rule.” 












From Network Society to Network-Centric Warfare 
 
While George W. Bush gears America up for war and tells his 
country that the war it will be fighting will be like none it has fought 
before, US strategic analysts have already developed the key concept that 
will govern this war and the discourse that will characterise it. Persistent 
reference has already been made by the President to the kind of war that 
this will be. September 11
th
 2001 witnessed the advent of network-centric 
warfare.  
Recall that this war not only began with what strategic analysts call 
an asymmetric attack by members of a complex terrorist network. The 
destruction of the World Trade Centre on real time network TV was a 
strategic surprise attack on an even more complex network, global 
network society itself, of which the US is the epicentre. Knowledge 
based, globally linked through complex adaptive connections of every 
description, the terrorists exploited the very strategic strength of network 
society, its openness and connectivity, to send violent shock waves 
throughout the capillaries that channel its flows of image, information, 
technology, people and capital. The reverberations of the attack are still 
fanning out from ground zero in New York. We are only just beginning to 
appreciate how the shock waves will amplify the force of the attack as 
they course through the connectivities of network-society.  
Some clue to the likely nature of the war that is already being 
waged is available from the new strategic discourse of network-centric 
warfare that the US strategic community developed during the 1990s. 
Under the US 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Re-
organization Act, a Roles and Missions Commission must present a report 
to the Secretary of Defense every three years. The report issued by the 
commission in 1996 argued that a central mission to guide the US armed 
services was missing and urgently required to provide overall strategic 
cohesion and direction for the 21st century The outcome was a document 
entitled Joint Vision 2010 (1996). This advocated a strategy of network-
centric warfare, moving to more lethal military capabilities not simply by 
adopting the information and communication technology fuelling the so-
called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) more extensively and more 
intensively than hitherto, but by systematically utilising information as 
the generative principle of formation for all aspects of military 
organisation. A revised Joint Vision 2020, issued in May 2000, extended 
and embraced network-centric warfare as the principle of formation 
governing all US national strategy. It also raised the question of how the 
NATO alliance could be drawn into the evolving strategic web of 
network-centric thinking (Dillon and Reid, 2001). 
Network-centric thinking is consciously modelled on fundamental 
changes that have taken place in the American and in the global economy. 
They draw their inspiration not simply from the revolution in information 
and communication technology and the molecular revolution in biology, 
but also from the confluence of the two. Here a convergence of thinking 
based on the overarching power of code is fuelling new ways of 
interpreting threat and of making war. Network operations are now 
claimed to deliver to the US military the same powerful advantages that 
they produced for American and global businesses. In network-centric 
warfare, information, speed, self-synchronisation and flexibility are said 
to be at a premium just as they are in the global economy.  This new 
strategy is officially characterised by four themes.  
 
1. The first is the shift in focus from the weapons platform – the 
battle tank, the aircraft carrier, the strategic bomber - to the 
information network, as the key military unit. 
2. The second is a shift from individual military actors or units to 
radical relationality; from viewing actors as independent 
operators to viewing them as part of continuously adapting 
military systems operating in constantly changing battlescapes.  
3. The third is a tendency towards interpreting the operations of 
complex adaptive military systems in biological terms. Like 
‘natural’ organisms, military systems are now said to co-evolve 
and adapt ecologically through interaction with each other and 
the battlespace-as-ecosystem that they inhabit. 
4. The fourth feature is the conviction that information is the 
prime mover in military as in every other aspect of human 
affairs, the basic constituent of all matter. This elevation of 
information does not simply open-up new enterprises for the 
military as it does for business - information warfare and 
digitised battlespaces for the military, e-commerce and so on for 
business. Neither does it mean that information is only a force 
multiplier, as the military say, increasing the fire-power and 
effectiveness of traditional weapon systems. Information has 
been embraced as the new principle of formation for all military 
systems, initiating a whole-scale re-thinking of the very basis of 
military organisation, doctrine, force requirements, procurement 
policies, training and operational concepts. Military formations 
no longer simply rally around the flag they form-up, mutate and 
change around information networks (Dillon and Reid, 2001; 
Dillon, 2002). 
 
Network-centric warfare has also been stimulated of course by 
military self-interest as the US defence establishment sought new 
rationales for itself at the end of the Cold War. It also remains a 
controversial and contested strategic doctrine within the US strategic 
community. The platform specialists, the service advocates and the old 
geopolitical warriors, for whom weapon systems, states and territories 
remain the single most important elements of international politics, all 
contest its assumptions and loathe its new jargon. That is why we will 
witness a trial of strength between the traditionalists and the network 
warriors as the conflict proceeds, and why we will see an admixture of 
traditional geo-strategic and network-centric warfare. Indeed the vast 
expansion of the US defence budget recently announced by President 
Bush testifies to the continuing power of the warfare traditionalists. But it 
is the warfare revolutionaries who are leading the way in operations 
against ‘The Terror’. 
Many protagonists in this strategic debate also try to maintain that 
the revolution in information and communication technology has not 
caused much of a so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), or that 
it has only done so in the US. In one very limited sense these opponents 
of network-centric warfare and of the information revolution are correct. 
There has been no exclusive Revolution in Military Affairs. The RMA is 
the military face of the revolution in global affairs brought about in 
particular by the coincidence of the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
revolutionary digitalisation of information and communication 
technology. Suffice it to say then that the RMA is as much an exclusively 
American way of making war, as capitalism is an exclusively American 
way of making a living. Everybody practices it to one degree or another, 
most especially those who orchestrated the destruction of the World Trade 
Centre. For nothing was better designed to send such a powerful, 
threatening and radically disruptive message around the world’s 
communication networks than the bloody spectacle engineered on 11
th
 
September 2001.  
Here, then, information has become the new metaphysic of power. 
To have a name and a strategic design for such a war tells us little 
however about how it was engendered, how it will progress and what 
transformations it will in turn effect. We have been told that it will be a 
different kind of war. We have been told that it will be very long. And we 
have been told that we will have to think differently about it. More than 
anything else we have been told that the very categories and distinctions 
that give us the old vocabulary of war do not hold here. We are in the 
midst of a radical dissolution of the markers of certainty that gave us all 
our old bearings in relation to war. Traditional forms of conquest, as well 
as traditional measures of national capability, land or raw materials, for 
example, recede dramatically in significance under the dynamics of 
network-centric warfare. Territorial conquest and domination is not what 
network-centric warfare is about albeit traditional geo-strategic factors 
are still very much also in play, such as those concerning oil in the 
Caspian Basin. The object is not to seize territory or to free it, as in the 
Gulf War at the end of the last century. Network forces will not mobilise, 
march to the front or conduct mass frontal assaults or landings in order to 
defeat the enemy. More likely they will swarm. So think bees. Galvanised 
by information and intelligence garnered through the critical global 
infrastructures of surveillance and communication systems, network 
forces will swarm in combined arms and together with hired locals, 
gather and disperse in different volumes and formations, combinations 
and directions. The many theatres of this network-centric warfare will 
also be as virtual as geographic, coursing through the capillaries and 
conduits that comprise network society itself. Conflict will newly 
configure and exploit these spaces of encounter: re-routing, re-regulating 
and re-engineering them. The duration of hostilities threatens to be just as 
indeterminate as the new battlespace. The tempi of operations differently 
employed, modulated and orchestrated. Most problematic and disturbing 
of all however is the politically prominent issue of the friend/enemy 
distinction. Who is the enemy? What is the enemy? Where is the enemy? 
How does the discourse of infinite threat impact on the discourse of 
security that not only propels the war but that foundationally legitimates 
the political order that is committed to waging it?  
All wars are fought to shape an inside in the process of contesting 
the outside. Network-centric warfare embraces this very logic since the 
principle of formation governing networks does not operate according to 
any simple inside/outside dichotomy. That is their point. They operate 
according to diverse and mutable principles of formation that effect 
changing complexes of fluid, multiple and adaptable connections. Their 
distinguishing characteristic is to have many diverse and overlapping 
intersections so as to facilitate the flow of business, capital, people, and 
information. The very power of a network, (formulated as Maxwell’s 
Law) is directly proportional not to the diffeerential between inside and 
outside but to the number of nodes a net can incorporate and the extent to 
which it remains open and adaptable to other nodes, networks and 
environing changes. Skilled deployment of the practices that effect the 
folds comprising the illusion of inside/outside, exploiting the very 
productive undecidability of them, is a skilled prized by network 
operators. 
We are told then that the enemy is ‘The Terror’ (Simons and 
Benjamin, 2001).  But no one can tell us what this particular terrorism is, 
how many terrorists there are and what resources are required to defeat 
them. This threat defies the kind of definition that would allow us to 
know it, know its location, assess its strength and overwhelm it in the 
traditional ways of war. In the emerging discourse of network-centric war, 
terrorism becomes a hyperthreat. Not merely hyperbolic, threatening, to 
insert nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological dangers into the 
arteries and nodes of network society, ‘The Terror’ is a threat without 
definable referent. Bin Laden has become a simulacrum of the infinity of 
danger to which network society is exposed; a battlespace of infinite 
enmity and unlimited liability in a new kind of war without end. 
 




 September 2001, then, the United States found itself 
subject to the recoil of the violence of globalisation. Declaring war on the 
terror to which New York had been subject, the Bush administration 
invoked a global state of emergency to wage infinite war on an indefinite 
enemy. Integral to this pursuit of unlimited liability to infinite threat is the 
figment of originary political innocence. The outcome has been a radical 
suspension of the law in order to save the law - Camp X-ray its exemplar 
– as if, shock horror, the law was never continuously re-inaugurated in 
this way (Agamben, 1999; Derrida, ). 
Despite the novelties outlined above, How new is this 
phenomenon? What kind of strategy, what kind of power, what kind of 
politics is at work here? In one single most important respect the answer 
is that almost nothing is new. The strategic logic of modern power and 
politics remains the same, and the McCarthyism that attends them is 
equally familiar. The threshold of modernity where the life of the species 
came to be wagered on its defining political strategy was instituted long 
ago. Staking species survival on the success of that political strategy has 
been foundational to the political order of modernity since its emergence 
from the political and ideological revolutions of the 17
th
 century. 
Governability, including the right to be governed rather than destroyed, 
became a function of a violent phenomenological reduction. Strip being 
of its world, or hypostasise it as so being. Call that a state of emergency, a 
state of exception or else a state of nature. John Locke, prosaically, called 
it America: ‘In the beginning all the world was America’. Then, readmit 
being to being on condition of it meeting criteria adjudicated by the very 
authority instituted by this cardinal political manoeuvre. Not for the first 
time, also, does the operation of that strategy bequeath us a power politics 
driven to fuel the very danger security from which constitutes its original 
rationale. If the question of the ‘we’ is central to all political belonging, 
‘we’ are those gathered politically by this manoeuvre and its associated 
risk; not, in the first instance of species extinction but of reduction to 
species life valued only in as much as it provides raw material for orders 
of governance. ‘We’ are in turn those formed by the profoundly 
complicated political problematic of how, if at all, to re-formulate politics 
in ways that effect an exit from rather than another iteration of this 
terminal manoeuvre. A constantly cultivated innocence in respect of the 
operation of this strategy has repeatedly also to be lost in confrontation 
with the (un)deniable violence enacted by it. 
Understood strategically, modern political power is comprised of 
techniques, and of principles of formation, that order the relationality and 
freedom of the life presupposed by it. The strategizing of relationality 
effected by modern power is the positive production of the subjects that 
enact power, together with the desires, ambitions and problematics that 
preoccupy them as subjects. Unlike modern legitimations of power, this 
analytic of the strategic character of modern power observes that it cannot 
radiate from a subjective intentionality prior to the strategic operation of 
power itself. Subjects no more precede the operation of power than power 
precedes the conduct of subjects. Together, power as a complex strategy 
of subjectification comprises the event of human freedom - as well as its 
denial - currently taking place in modern times.  
Such strategising power presupposes and reproduces a life 
amenable to its sway: capable, that is, of bearing the ordering work of 
power itself. It is only in as much as it does so that strategising power 
becomes capable of continuously re-instituting itself. Sovereign power, 
for example, presupposes a form of life upon which the law can be 
inscribed, a life capable of reading and following the proscriptions and 
prescriptions of those inscriptions. Biopower presupposes a form of life 
subject to norms and capable of assimilating norms in the process of 
effecting its self-subjection. Strategically, however, such freedom 
becomes raw material for strategising techniques that ultimately honour it 
in terms only of its amenability to the strategic requirements of power 
itself.  
While the social is the distribution of relations of power, their 
components and their functions, politics does not derive from the need to 
satisfy functional social needs, the division of the social into its 
component parts, or from the interplay of class and group interests 
characterstic of some social formation: "It is not common usefulness that 
founds the political community any more than confrontation or the 
forming of interests." (Rancière, 1998: 19). Just as politics is no regional 
ontology of a metropolitan metaphysics - it does not derive from some 
philosophically determined arkhe - neither is it an epiphenomenon of the 
social. The social then does not pre-exist the strategical ordering of power 
that brings it into existence as the social formation that it is (Lefort, 1993; 
Ranciére, 1999). Nor is politics mere technique; strategic accounts of the 
ordering of order concerned with "holding on to the exercise of majesty, 
the curacy of divinity, the command of armies and the management of 
interests." (Rancière, 1998: 17). What politicises strategical power, and 
what strategises politics, is a challenge to how the strategic operation of 
power institutes the socius.  Politics is conflict over the generative 
principles of formation and strategic techniques that institute the social 
historically that simultaneoulsy also contests the reduction of life to the 
mere stuff of strategy. Strategy becomes politicised when the form of life 
that it presupposes is contested by the subjects of it in the name of that 
undetermined and commonly shared freedom that power presupposes in 
its confinement of life. 
 
The Convergence of Powers. 
 
“The present enquiry concerns precisely…[the] hidden point of 
intersection between the juridico-institutional and the biopolitical models 
of power….It can even be said that the production of the biopolitical 
body is the original activity of sovereign power. In this sense, biopolitics 
is at least as old as the sovereign exception” 
(Agamben, 1998: 6, emphasis in the original) 
 
We are indebted to Foucault amongst others then for at least two 
powerful insights into the strategic operation of power in the modern age. 
The first, that power is ordinarily experienced as a strategic formation 
operating in a productive net like way employing human freedom to 
shape historical manifestations of individual and collective life. The 
second, that political modernity is distinguished by a complex interplay 
of powers: biopolitical powers of individualisation, associated with the 
management of bodies and populations, and that totalising juridical power 
associated with the doctrine of sovereignty and the rise of the territorial 
state. The point of intersection where bio and geo-strategic power 
converge, as Giorgio Agamben shrewdly notes, is, ‘logically implicit in 
Foucault’s work,” but somehow also remains, ‘a blind spot”…or rather 
something like a vanishing point that the different perspectival lines of 
Foucault’s enquiry…converge toward without reaching.’ (Agamben, 
1998: 6). That convergence lies in the very strategical operation of power 
itself. In seeking to extend and realise the full range of Foucault’s 
strategic analytic of power, while exploring how modern power reduces 
politics to the continuous inauguration of what he calls bare life, 
Agamben teaches us how (Agamben, 1998). 
Classically, Agamben points out, in the analysis and formulations 
of both Hobbes and Schmitt, the formal structure of sovereign power 
comprises an exclusion that is included as excluded. The exclusion is the 
state of nature or the exception, that which is said to be outwith the law. 
In the process the very differentiation of inside/outside is instituted. 
Foucault might well have referred to this as a dividing practice. Agamben 
emphasises the following important features of this ‘exclusion that is 
included as excluded’ which constitutes the strategic manoeuvre that 
constitutes sovereign power.  
First, what is excluded is reduced, cast out or cast aside. That is to 
say it is a-bandoned. Hence Agamben’s formulation ‘the ban of 
sovereignty’ which contrast it with the contract of traditional contract 
theory. Second, in being excluded that which is cast out or cast aside is 
not severed of all relation with the power that in instituting this severance 
thereby brings itself into play; institutes itself. On the contrary, that which 
is excluded is manoeuvred by the very terms of this exclusion into a 
special relation with the power that comes into force by the very 
contrivance of the manoeuvre itself. That which is included-as-excluded 
is, “delivered over to its own separateness and at the same time consigned 
to the mercy,” of the power that a-bandons it. (Agamben, 1998: 110).  
Hence, for Agamben, the, “the state is founded not as the expression of a 
social contract but as an untying” (p. 90). That untying is a reduction of 
life, a rendering of it down (and out) into the raw material for the 
strategising manoeuvres which constitute the exercise of sovereign power 
over it. Sovereign power is not the metaphysical centre of decision, the 
existential expression of a political identity differentiated from its alien 
other. Sovereign power is a stitch-up that institutes a certain kind of 
power relation; that between a life rendered down into utile material and 
those thus empowered to order and re-order that material ventriloquating 
its interests, goals, desires, needs, purposes identity. 
Third, this is not of course a chronological event or sequence of 
events as posed for example by some readings of contract theory: “The 
state of nature,” for example, is “a state of exception in which the city 
appears for an instant…tanquam dissoluta.” What that means is that it 
appears as if it were in dissolution. The political order is considered as if 
it were dissolved in order to identify what constitutes and preserves as 
well as institutes it. The state of nature is thus, of course, “not a real 
epoch chronologically prior to the foundation of the city but a principle 
internal to the city, which appears at the moment the city is considered 
tanquam dissoluta.” (Agamben, 1998: 105). The foundation of sovereign 
power in this manoeuvre is also, “not an event achieved once and for all 
but is continually operative in the civil state in the form of the sovereign 
decision.” (Agamben, 1998: 109). This ensures the “survival of the state 
of nature at the very heart of the state.” (Agamben, 1998: 106). In this 
sense the state of nature is something like a state of exception and 
sovereign power is the power in which, “it is permitted to kill without 
committing homicide and without celebrating sacrifice.” (Agamben, 
1998: 83). Similarly with the state of exception: “The rule applies to the 
exception in no longer applying, in withdrawing from it. Here the state of 
exception is not the state of chaos that precedes order either. It is instead 
the situation that results from its suspension. This, too, is exclusion 
(suspension) by inclusion (operative) as excluded (suspended). 
Properly speaking, then, the topology of sovereign power is not a 
space at all. It is a threshold. As such it does work. That work is not 
simply or even primarily, however, to command the domain of the inside 
of law and of order. Rather, it is to effect a passage between inside and 
outside, law and violence, physis and nomos. The state of exception and 
of nature are not so much a spatio-temporal suspension, therefore, as a 
complex topologising figure in which not only the exception and the rule 
but also the state of nature and law, outside and inside, pass through one 
another. This is why Agamben characterises as, “the point of indistinction 
between violence and law, the threshold on which violence passes over 
into law and law passes over into violence.” (Agamben, 1998: 32). He 
concludes: “the sovereign nomos is the principle that, joining law and 
violence, threatens them with indistinction.” (Agamben, 1998: 31). 
Sovereign power and violence therefore opens a zone of 
indistinction between law and nature, outside and inside, violence and 
law, war and politics. “Since ‘there is no rule that is applicable to chaos’, 
chaos must first be included in the juridical order through the creation of 
indistinction between inside and outside, chaos and the normal situation.” 
(Agamben, 1998: 19).  And yet sovereign power is precisely the power 
that maintains itself as deciding on these pairs to the very degree that 
sovereign power renders them indistinguishable from each other. 
(Agamben, 1998: 64). The violence exercised in the state of nature 
neither preserves nor simply posits law but rather “conserves it in 
suspension and posits it in excepting itself from it.” (Agamben, 1998: 64). 
It is for these reasons that Agamben characterises the law of sovereign 
power as “this ‘law beyond law to which we are abandoned’ that is the 
self-suppositional power of nomos.” (Agamben, 1998: 58). What applies 
in respect of Hobbes’ state of nature similarly applies in respect of 
Schmitt’s state of exception. It was of course on this basis that Schmitt 
formulated his classical definition of the political in terms of drawing the 
friend/enemy distinction. For Schmitt, too, sovereign is the power “which 
applies to the exception in no longer applying.” (Agamben, 1998: 46). 
Sovereign power then is an act of differentiation and individuation 
that divides itself into “constituting power and constituted power and 
maintains itself in relation to both, positioning itself at their point of 
indistinction.” That is how and why all constitutions in establishing a 
constituted power simultaneously presuppose themselves also and 
simultaneously as constituting power (Agamben, 1998: 40; Derrida, 
1986; Honig, 1991; Dillon, 1992). Sovereign power - whether of the 
state, the nation, the people or the individual - is simultaneously posed 
then both, “on the violence that posits law and the violence that preserves 
it.” (Agamben, 1998: 40). 
Schmitt’s state of exception, in particular, shows clearly that the 
link between the localisation and ordering constitutive of the nomos of 
the earth always implies a zone that is excluded from law. It is a zone that 
takes the form of, “a ‘free and juridically empty space,’ in which the 
sovereign power no longer knows the limits fixed by the nomos or the 
territorial order.” (Agamben, 1998: 36). Similarly, neither is the state of 
nature truly external to nomos “but rather contains its virtuality.” 
(Agamben, 1998: 35). In the classical age of the Jus Europaeum, this 
zone actually corresponded to the so-called ‘New World.’ That is why 
Locke was able to say that: “In the beginning all the world was America.” 
(Agamben, 1998: 36). 
“One of the paradoxes of the state of exception,” Agamben notes, 
“lies in the fact that in the state of exception it is impossible to distinguish 
transgression of the law from execution of the law, such that what 
violates a rule and what conforms to it coincide without any remainder.” 
(Agamben, 1998: 57) The work of sovereign power is to produce bare 
life. Bare life is life without remainder, specifically without the remains 
of anything that might dislocate the accounting of the conjunction of 
sovereign power and police in the order of governance. According to 
Agamben’s analysis of the formal structure of sovereign power, “the 
exception is that which cannot be included in the whole of which it is a 
member and cannot be a member of the whole in which it is always 
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